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THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
IN DISPUTE WHICH PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In their brief, the Robinsons cite this court's recent decision in the case of Turner v. 
General Adjustment Bureau. 832 P.2d 62 (Utah App. 1992). In the Turner, supra, case, this 
court reiterated the mandate that for fraud to exist, the Plaintiff must prove, and the trial court 
must find by "clear and convincing" evidence each of the following elements: 
(1) a representation was made; 
(2) concerning a presently existing material fact; 
(3) which was false; 
(4) which the representor either 
(a) knew to be false; or 
(b) made recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such a representa-
tion; 
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; 
(6) that the other party acting reasonably and in ignorance of its 
falsity; 
(7) did in fact rely upon it; 
(8) and was thereby induced to act; 
(9) to that party's injury and damage. 
Id. 832 P.2d at 66; also citing Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty. 641 P.2d 124, 
126 (Utah 1982); Pace v. Parrish. 122 Utah 141, 144-45,247 P.2d 273, 274-75 
(1952). 
The only factual evidence presented to the trial court by the Robinsons in support of their 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was the December 2, 1992 deposition of Kevin K. 
Gneiting. No other testimony, no affidavits, and no other evidence was presented to the court 
to establish the requisite elements of a claim sounding in fraud. 
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Accordingly, the testimony in Mr. Gneiting's deposition must established by "clear and 
convincing11 evidence each of the elements of fraud set forth in Turner v. General Adjustment 
Bureau, supra, and its progeny. 
In their brief, the Robinsons argue that the "representation11 made by appellants was in 
essence the allegations contained in the Foreclosure Complaint prepared by attorney James T. 
Dunn dated January 27, 1992 (Appellee's Brief, p. 10). Those allegations, among other things, 
sought reformation of a real estate mortgage on Lot 63 of the Summit Park Plat "JH property. 
The Foreclosure Complaint shows Kay Gneiting as the sole plaintiff. Yet, when 
questioned about the Complaint in his deposition, Gneiting testified as follows: 
On page 22, line 4 through 25: 
Q. Did you hire Mr. Dunn to file this lawsuit for you? 
A. Mr. who? 
Q. Mr. Dunn, the attorney that represented you in this lawsuit? 
A. The only thing I remember was Dennis was handling the procedure, and he had 
come back three or four times trying to get me to give Mr. Dunn a call. He 
either came or phoned by telephone, and I finally said okay. They said, Well, 
this is it. This is all you need to do. Give them a phone call and say go ahead 
for it so that's what I did. Whatever it is, go ahead. Whatever I'm supposed to 
do, that's what I told Mr. Dunn. 
Q. Was it all arranged by Dennis? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. Did Rick Hubble have anything to do with it? 
A. No, he didn't. 
Q. Not a thing? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Page 27, line 20 through Page 28, line 2: 
Q. Did you ever tell your attorney that Rick Hubble owed you $37,000? 
A. Did I ever do what? 
Q. Did you ever tell Mr. Dunn that Rick Hubble owed you $37,000? 
A. I never talked to Mr. Dunn only on that phone call that said whatever it is, go 
ahead. That's the only time I ever talked to him. 
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There was no evidence presented to the trial court, which by a "clear and convincing1' 
standard, shows Kerry Rick Hubble or Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. knowingly or 
recklessly made any false representation to the Robinsons. At best, the evidence shows that the 
Third Party Defendant, Dennis Vance, is the individual who contacted Mr. Dunn to file the 
Foreclosure Complaint, arguably without any knowledge whatsoever on the part of Gneiting, 
Hubble or Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. (Gneiting deposition p.22, lines 9-23; p.24 lines 
16-21; p.27, lines 23-25, p.28, lines 1-2; p.30, lines 6-16.) 
The Gneiting deposition also established that several months prior to the Foreclosure 
action, Gneiting and Hubble entered into some form of an agreement whereby Gneiting sought 
to purchase Lot 63 from Hubble. Indeed, Gneiting also testified that he commenced doing work 
on the property and making improvements thereon. Subsequently, Gneiting ran into financial 
problems and was forced to abandon his dream to finish a cabin or homesite on the Lot 63 
property. Nonetheless, in an effort to compensate Gneiting for his contribution in labor and 
materials to the property, Gneiting and Hubble, at least verbally agreed that Hubble would repay 
Gneiting for the contribution he had made for value to the property both via his direct 
expenditure of labor and materials to the property, but also via his labor performed for 
Wilderness in lieu of the payments that came due during the period of the initial purchase 
agreement. Gneiting testified in his deposition at Page 14, lines 15 through 18 the following: 
Q. And you were supposed to pay Mr. Hubble $370 commencing November 15, 
1987, and quarterly thereafter? 
A. That's on here but what I did I exchanged it for labor. 
On page 15, lines 24 and 25; Page 16, lines 1 through 10: 
Q. Let me see if I understand correcdy. Originally under this mortgage you agreed 
to pay $370 to Mr. Hubble quarterly in payment for the property, is that right? 
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A. Yes, we did. 
Q. And later you couldn't make those payments, is that right? 
A. Right. 
Q. And so you and Mr. Hubble agreed orally that rather than pay that $370, you 
would somehow work for him or put labor or something into— 
A. Yes. 
Page 21, lines 17 through 24: 
Q. You've testified that you couldn't afford to pay that money so you did work for 
Mr. Hubble or Wilderness Building to satisfy that $370 per quarter. Is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. You made payments by doing work. That's correct? 
A. Correct. 
No one ever intended that when Gneiting abandoned his desire to purchase Lot 63, that 
he would forfeit his expenditure of labor and materials toward that end. There was no evidence 
before the trial court that Hubble or Wilderness Building Systems had any knowledge of 
representations made by Gneiting or his attorney to the Robinsons. In fact, no evidence was 
even presented from the Robinson's perspective concerning what representations, if any, were 
made to them; who if anyone made such representation; and if in fact they relied on any such 
representation. We do know that the Robinsons entered into a Stipulation and Settlement 
Agreement in the foreclosure action, but no basis is cited in the Stipulation for that settlement. 
It is also interesting to note that the Stipulation at paragraph 4 specifically provides that: 
4. It is understood and agreed that this payment of $2,500.00 does not 
extinguish any obligation that Kerry Rick Hubble may owe to the 
Defendants Robinson, that it is a payment only by the Plaintiff (Gneiting) 
to clear title to the particular piece of property. 
Despite the fact that the Robinsons entered into the Stipulation and Settlement 
Agreement, the obligation due pursuant to the judgment was not extinguished. The Robinsons 
still had every right to pursue collection of the judgment against all defendants. Without any 
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evidence whatsoever to the contrary, it can also be argued that because there was indeed an offer 
to purchase Lot 63, the Robinsons, desiring to receive an immediate $2,500.00, agreed to 
release the lien they obtained by virtue of the judgment against Lot 63. Any other conclusion 
concerning the circumstances surrounding that settlement is simply not supported by the 
evidence. 
Plaintiffs never bothered to submit their own affidavit or testimony concerning the 
motion for summary judgment, nor did they ever attempt to depose Mr. Hubble or any other 
representative of Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. In moving for summary judgment on a 
claim for fraud, actual fraud is never presumed, but instead must be established by clear and 
convincing evidence. Territorial Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Baird. 781 P.2d 452, 462 (Utah 
App. 1989); Jensen v. Eames. 519 P.2d 236 (Utah 1974); In re Grooms. 13 B.R. 376, 379-83 
(D.Utah 1981). Fraudulent intent is ordinarily considered a question of fact. Territorial Savings 
& Loan Ass'n. v. Baird. 781 P.2d 452, 462 (Utah App. 1989); Gabaig v. Gabaig. 717 P.2d 
835, 838 (1986). 
It was wholly improper for the trial court to grant Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment against Defendants on Plaintiffs claims. At a minimum, the respective intent of each 
of the Defendants as it relates to the fraud claims raised in the First Cause of Action, are 
genuine issues of material fact which cannot be resolved short of a presentation of all of the facts 
at trial. Because the Robinsons failed to establish by undisputed factual evidence each and every 
prerequisite element necessary to succeed on their claim for fraud, the trial court erred in 
granting their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The circumstances of the lawsuit for 
reformation of the parties' agreement presented numerous factual questions. Among such 
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questions of fact evolve issues concerning Third-Party Defendant Dennis Vance's relationship 
to Wilderness Building Systems, Inc., Kerry Hubble and Kay Gneiting. In addition, questions 
of fact related to the various actors' respective intentions, activity and interaction remain 
unanswered and in dispute. Appellants contend that without an opportunity to present those 
issues to the finder of fact at a trial on the merits, summary disposition was inappropriate and 
constitutes reversible error. 
n. 
THE TRIAL ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT HUBBLE FOR THE 
ROBINSON DEBT WHICH WAS PREVIOUSLY 
DISCHARGED IN BANKRUPTCY 
Appellees have argued in their brief that their judgment lien against Lot 63 Mrode 
through" the Hubble bankruptcy. Of course, that argument assumes that the Stipulation and 
Settlement Agreement signed by the Robinsons was of no effect. 
Regardless of whether or not the judgment lien "rode through" the Hubble bankruptcy, 
the judgment obtained by the Robinsons against Defendant Hubble was properly discharged in 
bankruptcy. It is undisputed that on March 25, 1988, Kerry Rick Hubble filed for protection 
under the laws of the United States Bankruptcy Code, United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Utah, Case No. 88C-1741. Mr. Hubble properly listed the Robinson judgment in his 
bankruptcy statements and schedules in the amount of $27,280.56, and the Robinsons were given 
notice of Hubble's bankruptcy. (See U.S. Bankruptcy Court's docket sheet, bankruptcy schedule 
7 
identifying the Robinson debt, and Notice of Filing Bankruptcy which was filed with the Third 
District Court, each of which are attached to Appellants Brief as Exhibit ME\) 
The language of 11 U.S.C. %524(a)(l) voids the Robinsons' 1987 judgment to the extent 
that Kerry Rick Hubble has any personal liability therefor. The relevant portions of 11 U.S. C. 
§ 524(a)(1) provide: 
Effect of discharge. 
(a) A discharge in a case under this title -
(1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such judgment 
is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt 
discharged under section 727, 944, 1141, 1228 or 1328 of this title, whether or 
not discharge of such debt is waived. Id. 
The Robinsons' 1987 judgment was fully dischargeable as to Hubble's personal liability 
under the bankruptcy statute. It may be true that any judgment lien which attached to the real 
estate itself may have survived the bankruptcy, however, the property itself is not the subject 
of the Robinsons' lawsuit, nor do any of the Defendants in the case have any interest in said 
property. 
The claim asserted by the Robinsons against Hubble is based upon the judgment they 
obtained against Hubble in 1987, which was discharged in bankruptcy. In order for the 
Robinsons to properly pursue their judgment against Hubble and seek to have the 
dischargeability of said debt denied, it would have been necessary for them to file a complaint 
objecting to discharge in the bankruptcy proceeding itself, which was never done. The 
determination by the United States Bankruptcy Court is binding upon the Robinsons as a 
determination of their rights and no appeal or any other action has been taken in the Bankruptcy 
Court by the Robinsons who are bound by that Court's determination of dischargeability. 
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The Robinsons' complaint for fraud against Defendant Hubble was not properly before 
the trial court. Sections 523 and 727 of the United States Bankruptcy Code require that a 
creditor who is owed a debt which he claims the debtor's personal liability is exempted from 
discharge must initiate proceedings in the bankruptcy court for an exception to discharge. 
Bankruptcy Rule 4007 sets forth the procedure for determination of the dischargeability of a 
debt. Bankruptcy Rule 4007(a) provides that a proceeding to determine dischargeability of a 
particular debt be initiated by a complaint to be filed with the [bankruptcy] court. Bankruptcy 
Rule 4007(e) provides that the proceeding commenced by the filing of a complaint under Rule 
4007 is governed by the adversary rules in Part VII. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, Section 523.11 
(15th ed. 1989). 
The Robinsons attempt to have the trial court override the effect of the bankruptcy 
discharge was totally improper. Because they failed to properly commence such an adversary 
proceeding objecting to dischargeability, their claims against Hubble should have been dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
The only evidence before the trial court in support of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment was the December 2, 1992 deposition of Kay Gneiting. Clearly, Mr. 
Gneiting's testimony in the deposition, particularly if the facts and all evidence are construed, 
including reasonable inferences, in a light most favorable to Appellants, does not and cannot 
support such a finding. Based upon the foregoing authorities and argument, and given the 
existence of genuine issues of material fact which preclude the entry of summary judgment at 
the trial court, Appellants Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. and Kerry Rick Hubble respectfully 
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request that this Court reverse the decision of the lower court and remand the case thereto for 
trial on the merits. 
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